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SYNOPSIS sshd [-deiqD46] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g lo- gin_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-p port] [-u len] [-V client_protocol_id] DESCRIPTION sshd (SSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Togeth- er these proM-- grams replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. The programs are intended to be as easy to install and use as possible. sshd is the daemon that listens for connections from clients. It is norM-- mally started at boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incomM-- ing connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, en- cryption, auM-- thentication, command execution, and data exchange. This implementation of sshd supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simulta- neously. sshd works as follows. SSH protocol version 1 Each host has a host-specific RSA key (normally 1024 bits) used to idenM-- tify the host. Additionally, when the daemon starts, it generates a server RSA key (normally 768 bits). This key is normally regenerated evM-- ery hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects the daemon responds with its pub- lic host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256 bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the servM-- er. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, cur- fundamentally insecure, but can be enabled in the server configuration file if desired. System security is not improved unless rshd(8), rlogind(8), rexecd(8), and rexd(8) are disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin(1) and rsh(1) into the machine). SSH protocol version 2 Version 2 works similarly: Each host has a host-specific DSA key used to identify the host. However, when the daemon starts, it does not generate a server key. Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric ci- pher, currently 128 bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192 bit AES, or 256 bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those ofM-- fered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-sha1 or hmac-md5). Protocol version 2 provides a public key based user (Pub- keyAuthenticaM-- tion) or client host (HostbasedAuthentication) authentica- tion method, conventional password authentication and challenge response based methM-- ods. Command execution and data forwarding If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, for- warding TCP/IP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connec- tion over the secure channel. Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of sshd can be configured using command-line options or a con- figuration file. Command-line options override values specified in the configuraM-- tion file. sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name it was started as, ie. /usr/sbin/sshd. The options are as follows: -b bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral proto- col version 1 server key (default 768). -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to the system log, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Mul- tiple -d opM-- tions increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. -e When this option is specified, sshd will send the output to the standard error instead of the system log. -f configuration_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is /etc/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no configuraM-- tion file. -g login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (deM-- fault 600 seconds). If the client fails to authen- ticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. -h host_key_file Specifies the file from which the host key is read (default take tens of seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was reM-- generated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512) using sshd from inetd may be feasible. -k key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivaM-- tion for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour, it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted commu- nications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerat- ed. -p port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beM-- ginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overM-- flow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the utmp file. -D When this option is specified sshd will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. The following keywords are possible. AFSTokenPassing Specifies whether an AFS token may be forwarded to the server. Default is ``yes''. AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group names, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patM-- terns. `*' and `?' can be used as wildcards in the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID isn't recogM-- nized. By default login is allowed regardless of the group list. AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The default is ``yes''. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve seM-- curity unless users are also denied shell access, as they can alM-- ways install their own forwarders. AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user names, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users names that match one of the patterns. `*' and `?' can be used as wildM-- cards in the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID isn't recognized. By default login is al- lowed regardless of the user name. Banner In some jurisdictions, sending a warning message be- fore authentiM-- cation may be relevant for getting legal protection. The conM-- tents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. This option is only available for protocol version 2. CheckMail Specifies whether sshd should check for new mail for interactive logins. The default is ``no''. ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, sshd will send a mes- sage through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be sent without sshd receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive mes- sages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from Keepalive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by Keepalive is spoofable. You want to use the client alive mecha- nism when you are basing something important on clients having an active conM-- nection to the server. The default value is 3. If you set ClientAliveInter- val (above) to 15, and leave this value at the default, unrespon- sive ssh clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a number of group names, separatM-- ed by spaces. Users whose primary group or supple- mentary group in the patM-- terns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID isn't recM-- ognized. By default login is allowed regardless of the user name. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to con- nect to ports forwarded for the client. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authen- tication toM-- gether with successful public key client host au- thentication is allowed (hostbased authentication). This option is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol ver- sion 2 only. The default is ``no''. HostKey Specifies the file containing the private host keys (default /etc/ssh_host_key) used by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. Note that sshd will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessiM-- ble. It is possible to have multiple host key files. ``rsa1'' keys are used for version 1 and ``dsa'' or ``rsa'' are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in RhostsAuthentication, RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication. /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The deM-- fault is ``yes''. IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether sshd should ignore the user's $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentica- tion or initely on the server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming server resources. The default is ``yes'' (to send keepalives), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host reboots. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. To disable keepalives, the value should be set to ``no'' in both the server and the client configuration files. KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is al- lowed. This can be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if Passwor- dAuthentication is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's idenM-- tity. Default is ``yes''. KerberosOrLocalPasswd If set then if password authentication through Ker- beros fails then the password will be validated via any addi- tional local mechanism such as /etc/passwd. Default is ``yes''. KerberosTgtPassing Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT may be forwarded to the server. Default is ``no'', as this only works when the Ker- beros KDC is actually an AFS kaserver. KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the us- er's ticket cache file on logout. Default is ``yes''. KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all prior Port options specified. The default is to lis- ten on all loM-- cal addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. AdM-- ditionally, any Port options must precede this op- tion for non port qualified addresses. LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not sucM-- cessfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 600 (seconds). LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from sshd. The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG. The default is INFO. Logging with level DEBUG vioM-- lates the privacy of users and is not recommended. MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algoM-- rithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol ver- sion 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separatM-- ed. The default is ``hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac- ripemd160@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96'' MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthen- ticated conM-- nections to the sshd daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the Login- GraceTime exM-- pires for a connection. The default is 10. Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by Specifies whether PAM challenge response authentica- tion is alM-- lowed. This allows the use of most PAM challenge re- sponse authenM-- tication modules, but it will allow password authen- tication reM-- gardless of whether PasswordAuthentication is dis- abled. The deM-- fault is ``no''. PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is al- lowed. The deM-- fault is ``yes''. PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it speci- fies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is ``no''. PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can login using ssh(1). The argument must be ``yes'', ``without-password'', ``forced-commands- only'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. If this option is set to ``without-password'' pass- word authentiM-- cation is disabled for root. If this option is set to ``forced-commands-only'' root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the command option has been specified (which may be use- ful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. If this option is set to ``no'' root is not allowed to login. PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process identi- fier of the sshd daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid. interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is ``yes''. Protocol Specifies the protocol versions sshd should support. The possiM-- ble values are ``1'' and ``2''. Multiple versions must be comma- separated. The default is ``2,1''. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is al- lowed. The deM-- fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol verM-- sion 2 only. ReverseMappingCheck Specifies whether sshd should try to verify the re- mote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. The default is ``no''. RhostsAuthentication Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv files is sufficient. Normally, this method should not be permitM-- ted because it is insecure. RhostsRSAAuthentication should be used instead, because it performs RSA-based host au- thentication in addition to normal rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv au- thentication. The default is ``no''. This option applies to proto- col version 1 only. RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authen- tication toM-- gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1 onM-- ly. RSAAuthentication the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes ac- cidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is ``yes''. Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file trans- fer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute upM-- on subsystem request. The command sftp-server(8) implements the ``sftp'' file transfer subsystem. By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 onM-- ly. SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from sshd. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOM-- CAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LO- CAL7. The deM-- fault is AUTH. UseLogin Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login sesM-- sions. Note that login(1) is never used for remote command exeM-- cution. The default is ``no''. X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for sshd's X11 forM-- warding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The default is ``no''. Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve secuM-- rity in any way, as users can always install their own forM-- warders. the FILES secM-- tion). 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time. 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints con- tents and quits (unless root). 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges. 5. Sets up basic environment. 6. Reads $HOME/.ssh/environment if it exists. 7. Changes to user's home directory. 8. If $HOME/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The ``rc'' files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in stan- dard input. 9. Runs user's shell or command. AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT The $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys file lists the RSA keys that are permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1 Similarly, the $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys2 file lists the DSA and RSA keys that are perM-- mitted for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication) in protocol version 2. Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a `#' are ignored as comments). Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by spaces: options, bits, expo- nent, modulus, comment. Each protocol version 2 public key consists of: options, keyM-- type, base64 encoded key, comment. The options fields are optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the option field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, moduM-- edit it. The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specificaM-- tions. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The folM-- lowing option specifications are supported: from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication, the canonical name of the remote host must be present in the com- ma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' serve as wildcards). The list may also contain patterns negated by prefixing them with `!'; if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not acM-- cepted. The purpose of this option is to optionally increase seM-- curity: RSA authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the us- er (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the connec- tion requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. Note that if you want a 8-bit clean channel, you must not request a pty or should specM-- ify no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict cerM-- tain RSA keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but noth- ing else. Forbids TCP/IP forwarding when this key is used for authenticaM-- tion. Any port forward requests by the client will return an erM-- ror. This might be used, e.g., in connection with the command option. no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for au- thentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). permitopen="host:port" Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only conM-- nect to the specified host and port. Multiple permi- topen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is perM-- formed on the specified hostnames, they must be lit- eral domains or addresses. Examples 1024 33 12121...312314325 ylo@foo.bar from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23...2334 ylo@niksula command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23...2323 backM-- up.hut.fi permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23...2323 SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The /etc/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh_known_hosts2, $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts, and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the adminis- cal host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to indiM-- cate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not acM-- cepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, e.g., from /etc/ssh_host_key.pub. The optional comM-- ment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as com- ments. When performing host authentication, authentication is ac- cepted if any matching line has the proper key. It is thus permissible (but not recomM-- mended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conM-- flicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script or by taking /etc/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. Examples closenet,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93 closenet.hut.fi cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= FILES /etc/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd. This file should be /etc/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These three files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using ssh-key- gen(1). /etc/primes Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie- Hellman Group Exchange". /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the pid of the one started last). The conM-- tent of this file is not sensitive; it can be world- readable. $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the RSA keys that can be used to log into the user's acM-- count. This file must be readable by root (which may on some maM-- chines imply it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS volume). It is recommended that it not be acM-- cessible by others. The format of this file is de- scribed above. Users will place the contents of their identity.pub files into this file, as described in ssh-keygen(1). $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys2 Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account. This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply it being world-readable if the user's key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted. The client uses the same files to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host. These files should be writable only by root/the owner. /etc/ssh_known_hosts should be world-readable, and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts can but need not be world- readable. /etc/ssh_known_hosts2 and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 These files are consulted when using protocol ver- sion 2 hostbased authentication to check the public key of the host. The key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted. The client uses the same files to verify that it is connecting to the correct reM-- mote host. These files should be writable only by root/the ownM-- er. /etc/ssh_known_hosts2 should be world-readable, and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 can but need not be world- readable. /etc/nologin If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone ex- cept root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to any- one trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny If compiled with LIBWRAP support, tcp-wrappers ac- cess controls may be defined here as described in hosts_access(5). $HOME/.rhosts This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per line. The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in without password. The same file is used by rlogind and rshd. The file must be writable only by the user; it is recomM-- mended that it not be accessible by others. This file is used during .rhosts authentication. In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line. Users on those hosts are permitted to log in without a pass- word, provided they have the same user name on both machines. The host name may also be followed by a user name; such users are per- mitted to log in as any user on this machine (except root). Addi- tionally, the syntax ``+@group'' can be used to specify netgroups. Negated enM-- tries start with `-'. If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, loM-- gin is automatically permitted provided the client and server usM-- er names are the same. Additionally, successful RSA host authenM-- tication is normally required. This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended that it be world-read- able. Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in hosts.equiv. Beware that it really means that the named user(s) can log in as anybody, which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that own critical binaries and directories. Using a usM-- er name practically grants the user root access. The only valid use for user names that I can think of is in nega- tive entries. Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin. /etc/shosts.equiv This is processed exactly as /etc/hosts.equiv. How- ever, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both rsh/rlogin and ssh. $HOME/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). "proto cookie" pair in standard input (and DISPLAY in environment). This must call xauth(1) in that case. The primary purpose of this file is to run any ini- tialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory beM-- comes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environM-- ment. This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: if read proto cookie; then echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie | xauth -q - fi If this file does not exist, /etc/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to store the cookie. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. /etc/sshrc Like $HOME/.ssh/rc. This can be used to specify ma- chine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer fea- tures and creM-- ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), sftp-server(8), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), rlogin(1), rsh(1) BSD Experimental September 25, 1999 14 Man(1) output converted with man2html |