/*
* $Id: otp_mppe.c,v 1.1.2.3 2006/10/24 05:15:46 fcusack Exp $
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
*
* Copyright 2001,2002 Google, Inc.
* Copyright 2005,2006 TRI-D Systems, Inc.
*/
#include "ident.h"
RCSID("$Id: otp_mppe.c,v 1.1.2.3 2006/10/24 05:15:46 fcusack Exp $")
/* avoid inclusion of these FR headers which conflict w/ OpenSSL */
#define _LRAD_MD4_H
#define _LRAD_SHA1_H
#include <rad_assert.h>
#include "extern.h"
#include "otp.h"
#include "otp_mppe.h"
#include <openssl/des.h>
#include <openssl/md4.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <string.h>
/*
* Add MPPE attributes to a request, if required.
*/
void
otp_mppe(REQUEST *request, otp_pwe_t pwe, const otp_option_t *opt,
const char *passcode)
{
VALUE_PAIR **avp = &request->reply->vps;
VALUE_PAIR *cvp, *rvp, *vp;
cvp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, pwattr[pwe - 1]);
rvp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, pwattr[pwe]);
switch (pwe) {
case PWE_PAP:
case PWE_CHAP:
return;
case PWE_MSCHAP:
/* First, set some related attributes. */
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy",
otp_mppe_policy[opt->mschap_mppe_policy], T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Encryption-Types",
otp_mppe_types[opt->mschap_mppe_types], T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
/* If no MPPE, we're done. */
if (!opt->mschap_mppe_policy)
return;
/*
* Generate the MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys attribute. This is not specified
* anywhere -- RFC 2548, par. 2.4.1 is the authority but it has
* typos and omissions that make this unimplementable. The
* code here is based on experimental results provided by
* Takahiro Wagatsuma <waga@sic.shibaura-it.ac.jp>.
* We only support 128-bit keys derived from the NT hash; 40-bit
* and 56-bit keys are derived from the LM hash, which besides
* being deprecated, has severe security problems.
*/
{
size_t i, passcode_len;
unsigned char password_unicode[2 * OTP_MAX_PASSCODE_LEN];
unsigned char password_md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char mppe_keys[32];
/* 0x ASCII(mppe_keys) '\0' */
char mppe_keys_string[2 + (2 * sizeof(mppe_keys)) + 1];
/* Zero the LM-Key sub-field (and padding). */
(void) memset(mppe_keys, 0, sizeof(mppe_keys));
/*
* The NT-Key sub-field is MD4(MD4(unicode(password))).
* Start by hashing the unicode passcode.
* This is broken because unicode chars are machine-ordered,
* but the spec (RFC 2433) doesn't say how to prepare
* the password for md4 (other than by example values).
*/
passcode_len = strlen(passcode);
for (i = 0; i < passcode_len; ++i) {
/* Set the high order 8 bits to 0 (little-endian) */
password_unicode[i * 2] = *passcode++;
password_unicode[i * 2 + 1] = 0;
}
/* first md4 */
(void) MD4(password_unicode, 2 * passcode_len, password_md);
/* second md4 */
(void) MD4(password_md, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH, &mppe_keys[8]);
#if 0 /* encoding now handled in lib/radius.c:rad_pwencode() */
{
unsigned char md5_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char encode_buf[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN];
int secretlen;
/* Now we must encode the key as User-Password is encoded. */
secretlen = strlen(request->secret);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf, request->secret, secretlen);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, request->packet->vector,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_keys[i] ^= md5_md[i];
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, mppe_keys, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_keys[i + 16] ^= md5_md[i];
}
#endif /* 0 */
/* Whew. Now stringify it for pairmake(). */
mppe_keys_string[0] = '0';
mppe_keys_string[1] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
(void) sprintf(&mppe_keys_string[i*2+2], "%02X", mppe_keys[i]);
vp = pairmake("MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys", mppe_keys_string, T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
} /* (doing mppe) */
break; /* PWE_MSCHAP */
case PWE_MSCHAP2:
{
size_t i;
unsigned char password_md_md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
/*
* MS-CHAPv2 requires mutual authentication; we must prove
* that we know the secret. This is a bit circuitous: set
* MD1 = SHA(MD4(MD4(unicode(password)))|NT_RESPONSE|MAGIC1),
* MD2 = MSB8(SHA(PEER_CHALLENGE|MS_CHAP_CHALLENGE|USERNAME)),
* and finally use SHA(MD1|MD2|MAGIC2) as the authenticator.
* The authenticator is returned as the string "S=<auth>",
* <auth> is the authenticator expressed as [uppercase] ASCII.
* See RFC 2759.
*/
{
size_t passcode_len;
unsigned char password_unicode[2 * OTP_MAX_PASSCODE_LEN];
unsigned char password_md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH];
SHA_CTX ctx;
unsigned char md1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char md2[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char auth_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
/* S= ( ASCII(auth_md) ) \0 */
char auth_md_string[2 + (2 * sizeof(auth_md)) + 1];
/*
* ugh. The ASCII authenticator (auth_md_string) is sent
* along with a single (useless) binary byte (the ID).
* So we must "stringify" it again (for pairmake()) since the
* binary byte requires the attribute to be of type "octets".
*/
/* 0x (ID) ( ASCII("S="ASCII(auth_md))) */
char auth_octet_string[2 + 2 + (2 * sizeof(auth_md_string))];
char *username = request->username->strvalue;
int username_len = request->username->length;
/* "Magic server to client signing constant" */
unsigned char magic1[39] =
{ 0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76,
0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65,
0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67,
0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74 };
/* "Pad to make it do more than one iteration" */
unsigned char magic2[41] =
{ 0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B,
0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F,
0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E,
0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
0x6E };
/*
* Start by hashing the unicode passcode.
* This is broken because unicode chars are machine-ordered,
* but the spec (RFC 2759) doesn't say how to prepare
* the password for md4 (other than by example values).
*/
passcode_len = strlen(passcode);
for (i = 0; i < passcode_len; ++i) {
/* Set the high order 8 bits to 0 (little-endian) */
password_unicode[i * 2] = *passcode++;
password_unicode[i * 2 + 1] = 0;
}
/* first md4 */
(void) MD4(password_unicode, 2 * passcode_len, password_md);
/* second md4 */
(void) MD4(password_md, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH, password_md_md);
/* MD1 */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, password_md_md, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, rvp->strvalue + 26, 24);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, magic1, sizeof(magic1));
SHA1_Final(md1, &ctx);
/* MD2 */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, rvp->strvalue + 2, 16);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, cvp->strvalue, 16);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, username, username_len);
SHA1_Final(md2, &ctx);
/* The Authenticator */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, md1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, md2, 8);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, magic2, sizeof(magic2));
SHA1_Final(auth_md, &ctx);
/* String conversion. */
auth_md_string[0] = 'S';
auth_md_string[1] = '=';
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(auth_md); ++i)
(void) sprintf(&auth_md_string[i * 2 + 2], "%02X", auth_md[i]);
/* And then octet conversion. Ugh! */
auth_octet_string[0] = '0';
auth_octet_string[1] = 'x';
(void) sprintf(&auth_octet_string[2], "%02X", rvp->strvalue[0]);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(auth_md_string) - 1; ++i)
(void) sprintf(&auth_octet_string[i * 2 +4], "%02X", auth_md_string[i]);
vp = pairmake("MS-CHAP2-Success", auth_octet_string, T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
} /* Generate mutual auth info. */
/*
* Now, set some MPPE related attributes.
*/
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Encryption-Policy",
otp_mppe_policy[opt->mschapv2_mppe_policy], T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Encryption-Types",
otp_mppe_types[opt->mschapv2_mppe_types], T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
/* If no MPPE, we're done. */
if (!opt->mschapv2_mppe_policy)
return;
/*
* Generate the MPPE initial session key, per RFC 3079.
* (Although, RFC 2548 leaves us guessing at how to generate this.)
* For MS-CHAPv2 we support all key lengths (40-, 56- and 128-bit),
* although MPPE via RADIUS supports only 40- and 128-bit keys.
* This is a bit more complicated than MS-CHAP. Start by generating
* a "master session key"
* MSB16(SHA(NTPasswordHashHash|NT_RESPONSE|MAGIC1)), where
* NTPasswordHashHash is MD4(MD4(unicode(password))), NT_RESPONSE
* is from the MS-CHAP2-Response attribute, and MAGIC1 is a
* constant from RFC 3079. Then, we derive asymmetric send/receive
* keys from the master session key. The "master send key" is
* MSBx(SHA(MASTERKEY|SHSPAD1|MAGIC3|SHSPAD2)),
* and the "master receive key" is
* MSBx(SHA(MASTERKEY|SHSPAD1|MAGIC2|SHSPAD2)), where
* MASTERKEY is the "master session key" generated above, and the
* other values are constants from RFC 3079. MSBx is the x-most
* significant bytes, where x is 5, 7, or 16 as appropriate for
* the desired key length. We always generate 16 byte (128-bit)
* keys, the NAS is required to truncate as needed.
*/
{
/* These constants and key vars are named from RFC 3079. */
/* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */
unsigned char Magic1[27] =
{ 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 };
/* "On the client side, this is the send key; "
"on the server side, it is the receive key." */
unsigned char Magic2[84] =
{ 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79,
0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65,
0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e };
/* "On the client side, this is the receive key; "
"on the server side, it is the send key." */
unsigned char Magic3[84] =
{ 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73,
0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e };
unsigned char SHSpad1[40] =
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
unsigned char SHSpad2[40] =
{ 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 };
unsigned char MasterKey[16];
unsigned char MasterSendKey[16];
unsigned char MasterReceiveKey[16];
SHA_CTX ctx;
unsigned char sha_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
#if 0 /* salting/encoding now handled in lib/radius.c:tunnel_pwencode() */
unsigned char md5_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
/* From RFC 2548: S R A */
unsigned char encode_buf[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2];
int secretlen;
/* A useless value required by RFC 2548. */
unsigned char salt[2];
unsigned char mppe_key[32]; /* 1 + 16 + padding */
/* 0x ( ASCII(salt) ) */
unsigned char mppe_key_string[2 + (2 * sizeof(salt)) +
/* ( ASCII(mppe_key) ) \0 */
(2 * sizeof(mppe_key)) + 1];
#else /* 0 */
/* 0x ( ASCII(mppe_key) ) \0 */
unsigned char mppe_key_string[2 + (2 * sizeof(MasterKey)) + 1];
#endif /* else !0 */
/* Generate the master session key. */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, password_md_md, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, rvp->strvalue + 26, 24);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1));
SHA1_Final(sha_md, &ctx);
(void) memcpy(MasterKey, sha_md, 16);
/* Generate the master send key. */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, MasterKey, 16);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, SHSpad1, 40);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, Magic3, sizeof(Magic3));
SHA1_Update(&ctx, SHSpad2, 40);
SHA1_Final(sha_md, &ctx);
(void) memcpy(MasterSendKey, sha_md, 16);
/* Generate the master receive key. */
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, MasterKey, 16);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, SHSpad1, 40);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, Magic2, sizeof(Magic3));
SHA1_Update(&ctx, SHSpad2, 40);
SHA1_Final(sha_md, &ctx);
(void) memcpy(MasterReceiveKey, sha_md, 16);
/*
* Now, generate the MS-MPPE-Send-Key attribute.
*/
#if 0
/* Setup the salt value. */
salt[0] = 0x80;
salt[1] = 0x01;
/* Encode the key. */
(void) memset(mppe_key, 0, sizeof(mppe_key));
mppe_key[0] = 16; /* length */
(void) memcpy(&mppe_key[1], MasterSendKey, 16);
secretlen = strlen(request->secret);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf, request->secret, secretlen);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, request->packet->vector,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen + 16, salt, 2);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_key[i] ^= md5_md[i];
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, mppe_key, 16);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + 16, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_key[i + 16] ^= md5_md[i];
/* Whew. Now stringify it for pairmake(). */
mppe_key_string[0] = '0';
mppe_key_string[1] = 'x';
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[2], "%02X", salt[0]);
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[4], "%02X", salt[1]);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mppe_key); ++i)
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[i*2+6], "%02X", mppe_key[i]);
#else /* 0 */
mppe_key_string[0] = '0';
mppe_key_string[1] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(MasterSendKey); ++i)
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[i*2+2], "%02X", MasterSendKey[i]);
#endif /* else !0 */
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Send-Key", mppe_key_string, T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
/*
* Generate the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute.
*/
#if 0
/* Setup the salt value. */
salt[0] = 0x80;
salt[1] = 0x02;
/* Encode the key. */
(void) memset(mppe_key, 0, sizeof(mppe_key));
mppe_key[0] = 16; /* length */
(void) memcpy(&mppe_key[1], MasterReceiveKey, 16);
secretlen = strlen(request->secret);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf, request->secret, secretlen);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, request->packet->vector,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen + 16, salt, 2);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_key[i] ^= md5_md[i];
(void) memcpy(encode_buf + secretlen, mppe_key, 16);
(void) MD5(encode_buf, secretlen + 16, md5_md);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
mppe_key[i + 16] ^= md5_md[i];
/* Whew. Now stringify it for pairmake(). */
mppe_key_string[0] = '0';
mppe_key_string[1] = 'x';
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[2], "%02X", salt[0]);
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[4], "%02X", salt[1]);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mppe_key); ++i)
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[i*2+6], "%02X", mppe_key[i]);
#else /* 0 */
mppe_key_string[0] = '0';
mppe_key_string[1] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(MasterReceiveKey); ++i)
(void) sprintf(&mppe_key_string[i*2+2], "%02X", MasterReceiveKey[i]);
#endif /* else !0 */
vp = pairmake("MS-MPPE-Recv-Key", mppe_key_string, T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
pairadd(avp, vp);
} /* (doing mppe) */
} /* PWE_MSCHAP2 */
break; /* PWE_MSCHAP2 */
} /* switch (pwe) */
return;
}
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