/**************************************************************************** * * * Kernel Initialisation * * Copyright Peter Gutmann 1997-2005 * * * ****************************************************************************/ #if defined( INC_ALL ) #include "crypt.h" #include "acl.h" #include "kernel.h" #else #include "crypt.h" #include "kernel/acl.h" #include "kernel/kernel.h" #endif /* Compiler-specific includes */ /* The kernel data block. All other kernel modules maintain a pointer to this data */ static KERNEL_DATA krnlDataBlock = { 0 }, *krnlData; /**************************************************************************** * * * Thread Functions * * * ****************************************************************************/ /* Execute a function in a background thread. This takes a pointer to the function to execute in the background thread, a set of parameters to pass to the function, and an optional semaphore ID to set once the thread is started. A function is run via a background thread as follows: void threadFunction( const THREAD_FUNCTION_PARAMS *threadParams ) { } initThreadParams( &threadParams, ptrParam, intParam ); krnlDispatchThread( threadFunction, &threadParams, SEMAPHORE_ID ) */ #ifdef USE_THREADS /* The function that's run as a thread. This calls the user-supplied service function with the user-supplied parameters */ THREADFUNC_DEFINE( threadServiceFunction, threadInfoPtr ) { const THREAD_INFO *threadInfo = ( THREAD_INFO * ) threadInfoPtr; ORIGINAL_INT_VAR( intParam, threadInfo->threadParams.intParam ); ORIGINAL_INT_VAR( semaphore, threadInfo->semaphore ); /* We're running as a thread, call the thread service function and clear the associated semaphore (if there is one) when we're done. We check to make sure that the thread params are unchanged to catch erroneous use of stack-based storage for the parameter data */ threadInfo->threadFunction( &threadInfo->threadParams ); assert( threadInfo->threadParams.intParam == ORIGINAL_VALUE( intParam ) ); assert( threadInfo->semaphore == ORIGINAL_VALUE( semaphore ) ); if( threadInfo->semaphore != SEMAPHORE_NONE ) clearSemaphore( threadInfo->semaphore ); THREAD_EXIT( threadInfo->syncHandle ); } /* Dispatch a function in a background thread. If the threadParams value is NULL we use the kernel's thread data storage, otherwise we use the caller-provided storage */ int krnlDispatchThread( THREAD_FUNCTION threadFunction, THREAD_STATE threadState, void *ptrParam, const int intParam, const SEMAPHORE_TYPE semaphore ) { THREAD_INFO *threadInfo = \ ( threadState == NULL ) ? &krnlData->threadInfo : \ ( THREAD_INFO * ) threadState; THREAD_HANDLE dummy; int status; /* Preconditions: The parameters appear valid, and it's a valid semaphore (SEMAPHORE_NONE is valid since it indicates that the caller doesn't want a semaphore set) */ PRE( sizeof( THREAD_STATE ) >= sizeof( THREAD_INFO ) ); PRE( threadFunction != NULL ); PRE( threadState == NULL || \ isWritePtr( threadState, sizeof( THREAD_STATE ) ) ); PRE( semaphore >= SEMAPHORE_NONE && semaphore < SEMAPHORE_LAST ); /* Initialise the thread parameters */ memset( threadInfo, 0, sizeof( THREAD_INFO ) ); threadInfo->threadFunction = threadFunction; threadInfo->threadParams.ptrParam = ptrParam; threadInfo->threadParams.intParam = intParam; threadInfo->semaphore = semaphore; /* Fire up the thread and set the associated semaphore if required. There's no problem with the thread exiting before we set the semaphore because it's a one-shot, so if the thread gets there first the attempt to set the semaphore below is ignored */ THREAD_CREATE( threadServiceFunction, threadInfo, dummy, threadInfo->syncHandle, status ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) && semaphore != SEMAPHORE_NONE ) setSemaphore( semaphore, threadInfo->syncHandle ); return( status ); } #endif /* USE_THREADS */ /**************************************************************************** * * * Pre-initialisation Functions * * * ****************************************************************************/ /* Correct initialisation of the kernel is handled by having the object management functions check the state of the initialisation flag before they do anything and returning CRYPT_ERROR_NOTINITED if cryptlib hasn't been initialised. Since everything in cryptlib depends on the creation of objects, any attempt to use cryptlib without it being properly initialised are caught. Reading the initialisation flag presents something of a chicken-and-egg problem since the read should be protected by the intialisation mutex, but we can't try and grab it unless the mutex has been initialised. If we just read the flag directly and rely on the object map mutex to protect access we run into a potential race condition on shutdown: thread1 thread2 inited = T read inited = T inited = F, destroy objects lock objects, die The usual way to avoid this is to perform an interlocked mutex lock, but this isn't possible here since the initialisation mutex may not be initialised. If possible we use dynamic initialisation of the kernel to resolve this, taking advantage of stubs that the compiler inserts into the code to perform initialisation functions when cryptlib is loaded. If the compiler doesn't support this, we have to use static initialisation. This has a slight potential race condition if two threads call the init function at the same time, but in practice the only thing that can happen is that the initialisation mutex gets initialised twice, leading to a small resource leak when cryptlib shuts down */ #if defined( __WIN32__ ) || defined( __WINCE__ ) /* Windows supports dynamic initialisation by allowing the init/shutdown functions to be called from DllMain(), however if we're building a static library there won't be a DllMain() so we have to do a static init */ #ifdef STATIC_LIB #define STATIC_INIT #endif /* STATIC_LIB */ #elif defined( __GNUC__ ) && defined( __PIC__ ) && defined( USE_THREADS ) /* If we're being built as a shared library with gcc, we can use constructor and destructor functions to automatically perform pre-init and post-shutdown functions in a thread-safe manner. By telling gcc to put the preInit() and postShutdown() functions in the __CTOR_LIST__ and __DTOR_LIST__, they're called automatically before dlopen/dlclose return */ void preInit( void ) __attribute__ ((constructor)); void postShutdown( void ) __attribute__ ((destructor)); #elif defined( __PALMOS__ ) /* PalmOS supports dynamic initialisation by allowing the init/shutdown functions to be called from PilotMain */ #else #define STATIC_INIT #endif /* Systems not supporting dynamic initialisation */ /* Before we can begin and end the initialisation process, we need to initialise the initialisation lock. This gets a bit complex, and is handled in the following order of preference: A. Systems where the OS contacts a module to tell it to initialise itself before it's called directly for the first time. B. Systems where statically initialising the lock to an all-zero value is equivalent to intialising it at runtime. C. Systems where the lock must be statically initialised at runtime. A and B are thread-safe, C isn't thread-safe but unlikely to be a problem except in highly unusual situations (two different threads entering krnlBeginInit() at the same time) and not something that we can fix without OS support. To handle this pre-initialisation, we provide the following functions for use with case A, statically initialise the lock to handle case B, and initialise it if required in krnlBeginInit() to handle case C */ #ifndef STATIC_INIT void preInit( void ) { krnlData = &krnlDataBlock; memset( krnlData, 0, sizeof( KERNEL_DATA ) ); MUTEX_CREATE( initialisation ); } void postShutdown( void ) { MUTEX_DESTROY( initialisation ); memset( krnlData, 0, sizeof( KERNEL_DATA ) ); } #endif /* !STATIC_INIT */ /**************************************************************************** * * * Initialisation Functions * * * ****************************************************************************/ /* Begin and complete the kernel initialisation, leaving the initialisation mutex locked between the two calls to allow external initialisation of further, non-kernel-related items */ int krnlBeginInit( void ) { int status; #ifdef STATIC_INIT if( !krnlDataBlock.isInitialised ) { /* We're starting up, set up the initialisation lock */ krnlData = &krnlDataBlock; memset( krnlData, 0, sizeof( KERNEL_DATA ) ); MUTEX_CREATE( initialisation ); } #endif /* STATIC_INIT */ /* Lock the initialisation mutex to make sure that other threads don't try to access it */ MUTEX_LOCK( initialisation ); /* If we're already initialised, don't to anything */ if( krnlData->isInitialised ) { MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); return( CRYPT_ERROR_INITED ); } /* If the time is screwed up we can't safely do much since so many protocols and operations depend on it */ if( getTime() <= MIN_TIME_VALUE ) { MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); retIntError(); } /* Initialise the ephemeral portions of the kernel data block. Since the shutdown level value is non-ephemeral (it has to persist across shutdowns to handle threads that may still be active inside cryptlib when a shutdown occurs), we have to clear this explicitly */ CLEAR_KERNEL_DATA(); krnlData->shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_NONE; /* Initialise all of the kernel modules. Except for the allocation of the kernel object table this is all straight static initialistion and self-checking, so we should never fail at this stage */ status = initAllocation( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initAttributeACL( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initCertMgmtACL( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initInternalMsgs( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initKeymgmtACL( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initMechanismACL( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initMessageACL( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initObjects( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initObjectAltAccess( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initSemaphores( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusOK( status ) ) status = initSendMessage( krnlData ); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); assert( NOTREACHED ); return( status ); } /* The kernel data block has been initialised */ krnlData->isInitialised = TRUE; return( TRUE ); } void krnlCompleteInit( void ) { krnlData->isInitialised = TRUE; MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); } /* Begin and complete the kernel shutdown, leaving the initialisation mutex locked between the two calls to allow external shutdown of further, non-kernel-related items. The shutdown proceeds as follows: lock initialisation mutex; signal internal worker threads (async.init, randomness poll) to exit (shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_THREADS); signal all non-destroy messages to fail (shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_MESSAGES in destroyObjects()); destroy objects (via destroyObjects()); shut down kernel modules; shut down kernel mechanisms (semaphores, messages) (shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_MUTEXES); clear kernel data; */ int krnlBeginShutdown( void ) { /* Lock the initialisation mutex to make sure that other threads don't try to access it */ MUTEX_LOCK( initialisation ); /* If we're already shut down, don't to anything */ if( !krnlData->isInitialised ) { MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); return( CRYPT_ERROR_NOTINITED ); } /* Signal all remaining internal threads to exit */ krnlData->shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_THREADS; return( CRYPT_OK ); } int krnlCompleteShutdown( void ) { #if 0 /* The object destruction has to be performed between two phases of the external shutdown, so we can't currently do it here */ destroyObjects(); #endif /* 0 */ /* Once the kernel objects have been destroyed, we're in the closing-down state in which no more messages are processed */ assert( krnlData->shutdownLevel >= SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_MESSAGES ); /* Shut down all of the kernel modules */ endAllocation(); endAttributeACL(); endCertMgmtACL(); endInternalMsgs(); endKeymgmtACL(); endMechanismACL(); endMessageACL(); endObjects(); endObjectAltAccess(); endSemaphores(); endSendMessage(); /* At this point all kernel services have been shut down */ assert( krnlData->shutdownLevel >= SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_MUTEXES ); /* Turn off the lights on the way out. Note that the kernel data- clearing operation leaves the shutdown level set to handle any threads that may still be active */ CLEAR_KERNEL_DATA(); krnlData->shutdownLevel = SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_ALL; MUTEX_UNLOCK( initialisation ); #ifdef STATIC_INIT /* We're shutting down, destroy the initialisation lock */ MUTEX_DESTROY( initialisation ); memset( krnlData, 0, sizeof( KERNEL_DATA ) ); #endif /* STATIC_INIT */ return( CRYPT_OK ); } /* Indicate to a cryptlib-internal worker thread that the kernel is shutting down and the thread should exit as quickly as possible. We don't protect this check with a mutex since it can be called after the kernel mutexes have been destroyed. This lack of mutex protection for the flag isn't a serious problem, it's checked at regular intervals by worker threads so if the thread misses the flag update it'll bve caught at the next check */ BOOLEAN krnlIsExiting( void ) { return( krnlData->shutdownLevel >= SHUTDOWN_LEVEL_THREADS ); } /**************************************************************************** * * * Extended Self-test Functions * * * ****************************************************************************/ /* Self-test code for several general crypto algorithms that are used internally all over cryptlib: MD5, SHA-1, and 3DES (and by extension DES) */ #if defined( INC_ALL ) #include "capabil.h" #else #include "device/capabil.h" #endif /* Compiler-specific includes */ static BOOLEAN testGeneralAlgorithms( void ) { const CAPABILITY_INFO *capabilityInfo; int status; /* Test the MD5 functionality */ #ifdef USE_MD5 capabilityInfo = getMD5Capability(); status = capabilityInfo->selfTestFunction(); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); #endif /* USE_MD5 */ /* Test the SHA-1 functionality */ capabilityInfo = getSHA1Capability(); status = capabilityInfo->selfTestFunction(); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); /* Test the 3DES (and DES) functionality */ capabilityInfo = get3DESCapability(); status = capabilityInfo->selfTestFunction(); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); return( TRUE ); } /* Test the kernel mechanisms to make sure that everything's working as expected. This performs the following tests: General: Object creation. Access checks: Inability to access internal object or attribute via external message. Inability to perform an internal-only action externally, ability to perform an internal-only action internally Attribute checks: Attribute range checking for numeric, string, boolean, and time attributes. Inability to write a read-only attribute, read a write-only attribute, or delete a non-deletable attribute. Object state checks: Ability to perform standard operation on object, ability to transition a state = low object to state = high. Inability to perform state = high operation on state = low object, inability to perform state = low operation on state = high object. Object property checks: Ability to use an object with a finite usage count, inability to increment the count, ability to decrement the count, inability to exceed the usage count. Ability to lock an object, inability to change security parameters once it's locked */ static BOOLEAN testKernelMechanisms( void ) { MESSAGE_CREATEOBJECT_INFO createInfo; MESSAGE_DATA msgData; CRYPT_CONTEXT cryptHandle; static const BYTE FAR_BSS key[] = { 0x10, 0x46, 0x91, 0x34, 0x89, 0x98, 0x01, 0x31 }; BYTE buffer[ 128 + 8 ]; #ifdef USE_CERTIFICATES time_t timeVal; #endif /* USE_CERTIFICATES */ int value, status; /* Verify object creation */ setMessageCreateObjectInfo( &createInfo, CRYPT_ALGO_DES ); status = krnlSendMessage( SYSTEM_OBJECT_HANDLE, IMESSAGE_DEV_CREATEOBJECT, &createInfo, OBJECT_TYPE_CONTEXT ); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); cryptHandle = createInfo.cryptHandle; /* Verify the inability to access an internal object or attribute using an external message. The attribute access will be stopped by the object access check before it even gets to the attribute access check, so we also re-do the check further on when the object is made externally visible to verify the attribute-level checks as well */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, MESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_ALGO ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_OBJECT || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, MESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_IATTRIBUTE_TYPE ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_VALUE ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the ability to perform standard operations and the inability to perform a state = high operation on a state = low object */ setMessageData( &msgData, ( void * ) key, 8 ); memset( buffer, 0, 16 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_IV ) != CRYPT_OK || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_ERROR_NOTINITED ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the functioning of kernel range checking, phase 1: Numeric values */ status = CRYPT_OK; value = -10; /* Below (negative) */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 0; /* Lower bound fencepost error */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 1; /* Lower bound */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 10000; /* Mid-range */ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 20000; /* Upper bound */ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 20001; /* Upper bound fencepost error */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 32767; /* High */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_ITERATIONS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the functioning of kernel range checking, phase 2: String values. We have to disable the more outrageous out-of-bounds values in the debug version since they'll cause the debug kernel to throw an exception if it sees them */ status = CRYPT_OK; memset( buffer, '*', CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE + 1 ); #ifdef NDEBUG /* Below (negative) */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, -10 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; #endif /* NDEBUG */ /* Lower bound fencepost error */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 7 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; /* Lower bound */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 8 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; /* Mid-range */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE / 2 ); krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; /* Upper bound */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE ); krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; /* Upper bound fencepost error */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, CRYPT_MAX_HASHSIZE + 1 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; #ifdef NDEBUG /* High */ setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 32767 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEYING_SALT ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; #endif /* NDEBUG */ if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the ability to transition a state = low object to state = high */ setMessageData( &msgData, ( void * ) key, 8 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEY ) != CRYPT_OK ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the inability to write a read-only attribute, read a write- only attribute, or delete a non-deletable attribute */ value = CRYPT_MODE_CBC; setMessageData( &msgData, NULL, 0 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CTXINFO_BLOCKSIZE ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEY ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CTXINFO_MODE ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the inability to perform state = low operations on a state = high object */ setMessageData( &msgData, ( void * ) key, 8 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CTXINFO_KEY ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_GENKEY, NULL, FALSE ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the inability to perform an internal-only action externally but still perform it internally. We also repeat the internal-only attribute test from earlier on, this access is now stopped at the attribute check level rather than the object-check level. The object will become very briefly visible externally at this point, but there's nothing that can be done with it because of the permission settings */ value = \ MK_ACTION_PERM( MESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, ACTION_PERM_NONE_EXTERNAL ) | \ MK_ACTION_PERM( MESSAGE_CTX_DECRYPT, ACTION_PERM_NONE_EXTERNAL ); memset( buffer, 0, 16 ); krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_IATTRIBUTE_ACTIONPERMS ); krnlSendMessage( createInfo.cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, MESSAGE_VALUE_FALSE, CRYPT_IATTRIBUTE_INTERNAL ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, MESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_OK ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, MESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_IATTRIBUTE_TYPE ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_VALUE ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } krnlSendMessage( createInfo.cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, MESSAGE_VALUE_TRUE, CRYPT_IATTRIBUTE_INTERNAL ); /* Verify the ability to use an object with a finite usage count, the inability to increment the count, the ability to decrement the count, and the inability to exceed the usage count */ status = CRYPT_OK; value = 10; memset( buffer, 0, 16 ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_USAGECOUNT ) != CRYPT_OK || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 20; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_USAGECOUNT ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 1; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_USAGECOUNT ) != CRYPT_OK || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_OK || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_CTX_ENCRYPT, buffer, 8 ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify the ability to lock an object and the inability to change security parameters once it's locked */ value = 5; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_FORWARDCOUNT ) != CRYPT_OK || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, MESSAGE_VALUE_TRUE, CRYPT_PROPERTY_HIGHSECURITY ) != CRYPT_OK ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_LOCKED ) != CRYPT_OK || \ value != TRUE || \ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_FORWARDCOUNT ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) { /* Object should be locked, forwardcount should be inaccessible */ krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } value = 1; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_PROPERTY_FORWARDCOUNT ) != CRYPT_ERROR_PERMISSION ) { /* Security parameters shouldn't be writeable */ krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); /* The following checks require that use of certificates be enabled in order to perform them. This is because these attribute types are only valid for certificates (or, by extension, certificate-using object types like envelopes and sessions). So although these attribute ACLs won't be tested if certificates aren't enabled, they also won't be used if certificates aren't enabled */ #ifdef USE_CERTIFICATES /* Create a cert object for the remaining kernel range checks */ setMessageCreateObjectInfo( &createInfo, CRYPT_CERTTYPE_CERTIFICATE ); status = krnlSendMessage( SYSTEM_OBJECT_HANDLE, IMESSAGE_DEV_CREATEOBJECT, &createInfo, OBJECT_TYPE_CERTIFICATE ); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); cryptHandle = createInfo.cryptHandle; /* Verify functioning of the kernel range checking, phase 3: Boolean values. Any value should be OK, with conversion to TRUE/FALSE */ status = CRYPT_OK; value = 0; /* FALSE */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK || \ value != FALSE ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 1; /* TRUE */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK || \ value != TRUE ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = 10000; /* Positive true-equivalent */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK || \ value != TRUE ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = -1; /* Negative true-equivalent */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_GETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_CERTINFO_SELFSIGNED ) != CRYPT_OK || \ value != TRUE ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify functioning of the kernel range checking, phase 4: Time values. Any value above the initial cutoff date should be OK */ status = CRYPT_OK; setMessageData( &msgData, &timeVal, sizeof( time_t ) ); timeVal = -10; /* Below (negative) */ if( timeVal >= 0 ) /* time_t is unsigned, set the time to an alternative (but still too-small) values */ timeVal = 10; if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_VALIDFROM ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_STR1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; timeVal = MIN_TIME_VALUE; /* Lower bound fencepost error */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_VALIDFROM ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_STR1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; timeVal = MIN_TIME_VALUE + 1; /* Lower bound */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_VALIDFROM ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; timeVal = 0x40000000L; /* Mid-range */ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CERTINFO_VALIDFROM ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_VALIDFROM ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify functioning of kernel range-checking, phase 6: Special-case checks, allowed values. Valid values are either a 4-byte IPv4 address or a 16-byte IPv6 address */ value = CRYPT_CERTINFO_SUBJECTALTNAME; memset( buffer, 0, 16 ); setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 3 ); /* Below, allowed value 1 */ krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT ); if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 4 ); /* Equal, allowed value 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ); krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT ); setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 5 ); /* Above, allowed value 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 15 ); /* Below, allowed value 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 16 ); /* Equal, allowed value 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_OK ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DELETEATTRIBUTE, NULL, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ); krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT ); setMessageData( &msgData, buffer, 17 ); /* Above, allowed value 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE_S, &msgData, CRYPT_CERTINFO_IPADDRESS ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) { krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); return( FALSE ); } /* Verify functioning of kernel range-checking, phase 6: Special-case checks, subranges. Valid values are either CRYPT_CURSOR_FIRST ... CRYPT_CURSOR_LAST or an extension ID. Since the cursor movement codes are negative values, an out-of-bounds value is MIN + 1 or MAX - 1, not the other way round */ value = CRYPT_CURSOR_FIRST + 1; /* Below, subrange 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CURSOR_FIRST; /* Low bound, subrange 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CURSOR_LAST; /* High bound, subrange 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CURSOR_LAST - 1; /* Above, subrange 1 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CERTINFO_FIRST_EXTENSION - 1; /* Below, subrange 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CERTINFO_FIRST_EXTENSION; /* Low bound, subrange 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CERTINFO_LAST_EXTENSION; /* High bound, subrange 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ERROR_NOTFOUND ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; value = CRYPT_CERTINFO_LAST_EXTENSION + 1; /* Above, subrange 2 */ if( krnlSendMessage( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_SETATTRIBUTE, &value, CRYPT_ATTRIBUTE_CURRENT_GROUP ) != CRYPT_ARGERROR_NUM1 ) status = CRYPT_ERROR; krnlSendNotifier( cryptHandle, IMESSAGE_DECREFCOUNT ); if( cryptStatusError( status ) ) return( FALSE ); #endif /* USE_CERTIFICATES */ return( TRUE ); } int testKernel( void ) { if( !testGeneralAlgorithms() ) retIntError(); if( !testKernelMechanisms() ) retIntError(); return( CRYPT_OK ); }